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that helped me to transform the first draft of a talk into this paper, for which I am most grateful.
 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life has gathered invaluable information on religious attitudes in1
America through a series of polls over the years.  The most recent Report on surveys of 35,556 adults between May 8
and August 13, 2007 reveals that Americans report strong religious faith: 92% believe in God, 60% believe in a personal
God, and only 7% are unsure (The U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 2008: 5).  As the Report (19) summarizes, the
religious faith of Americans may be waning, but at this point remains quite strong:
The U.S. has largely avoided the secularizing trends that have reshaped the religious
scene in recent decades in European and other economically developed nations –
but not entirely.  The Landscape Survey documents, for example, that the number
of Americans who are not affiliated with a religion has grown significantly in recent
decades, with the number of people who today say they are unaffiliated with a
religious tradition (16% of U.S. adults) more than double the number who say they
were not affiliated with a religion as children (7%). It remains to be seen how this
trend toward secularization will ultimately impact religion in the U.S.  But what is
clear is that religion remains a powerful force in the private and public lives of most
Americans, a fact amply illustrated by the findings of the U.S. Religious Landscape
Survey discussed in this report.
 In the words of leading researchers in the area: “Europeans think that there is altogether too much religion in2
the United States, which has a dangerous effect on policy; Americans in turn are taken aback by Europe’s secularity”
(Berger 2008:3).  Although this description is “something of a cliche . . . [and] the reality to which it refers is seen to be
more complicated . . . the cliche does indeed mirror reality (Ibid:4; see also 124). 
Faith and Politics in the Post-Secular Age:
The Promise of President Obama
Francis J. Mootz III*
The citizens of the United States are much more demonstrably religious than the
citizens of the countries of Western Europe.   In my experience, Europeans are surprised by1
the high percentage of Americans who report that they believe in God, and more than a bit
bemused by the fundamentalist tendencies of many American believers.  On the other hand,
the average American appears to hold a dim view of the Godless and socialist-leaning
European societies.   If the modern era is properly characterized as the “age of secularism”2
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 Perhaps the most dramatic evidence is the relatively recent claim by Justice Douglas that we “are a religious3
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being” (Zorach 1952: 313).  This view was recently echoed in Justice
Scalia’s more generic monotheistic claim that the state may disregard nonbelievers and those who do not embrace the
God of Abraham by invoking or endorsing monotheism since that is the virtual unanimous religious view in the country
(McCreary 2005: 893).  
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– a time when constitutional democracies finally have shed the last vestiges of church
authority from the political realm and embrace a rationalist and humanist perspective – then
the United States appears to be outside the Western mainstream.  In this paper I explore how
the relationship between politics and religious faith in the United States might be seen as part
of the narrative of secularism that defines most other Western countries, even as the
differences in the American experience might suggest an evolution of this narrative.
Religion has always played an important role in American politics.  There has been
a consistent and not-so-subtle message that the United States is a Protestant Christian nation
in its ethics and outlook.   John F. Kennedy famously spoke before a convention of southern3
Protestant ministers to defend his Catholic faith and to reassure them that he would separate
his religious obligations from his obligations as President.  Mitt Romney’s bid for the
Republican nomination for President during 2008 was significant because he is a Mormon,
a faith viewed skeptically by many fellow Christians just as Kennedy’s Catholicism was
viewed with alarm in the 1960s.  The frequent mention during the 2000 presidential race that
Democratic vice-presidential nominee, Joe Lieberman, was an orthodox and observant Jew
appeared to be a strategy to counter any negative perceptions based on his non-Christian faith
by portraying him as a devout believer who fit within the country’s broader Judeo-Christian
heritage.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433545
 However, this dynamic may be more unstable than is commonly understood.  One of the surprising results of4
the Pew research is that Americans claim not to draw their politics directly from their religious beliefs.  “Relatively few
adults (14%) cite their religious beliefs as the main influence on their political thinking – about the same number as cite
their education as being most important (13%).  Far more cite their personal experience (34%) as shaping their political
views” (The U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 2008: 17).  This might be explained by the increasingly pluralistic
approach taken to religion by many Americans, see infra note 17, resulting in a less explicit link between the tenets of
their particular faith as a source of concrete political commitments but not necessarily undermining the importance of
religion generally to politics.
Faith probably plays a much more important role in many small political units in the United States where there
is greater religious homogeneity.  Stories about the evangelization of the small town of Wasilla, Alaska during and after
Sarah Palin’s stint as Mayor suggest that the intermingling of faith and politics at this level can be more overt,
exclusionary and unrepentant (Goldberg 2008).
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Public invocations of religion and God by American politicians are common, and they
undoubtedly grate against European sensibilities.  It is rare for a national politician to end an
important speech about some challenge facing the country without calling for God to bless
the United States.  This has been true of recent Presidents on the political spectrum ranging
from Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton.  When confronting his impeachment and sexual scandal,
Clinton famously turned to preachers to help him restore his sense of propriety.  There can
be no doubt: open professions of faith are a very real part of the national political landscape
in the United States.  I can emphasize this point best by stating that it is inconceivable to me
that an avowed and unapologetic atheist could win the nomination of a major political party,
not to mention win the Presidency.  Simply put, faith is too important to politics on the
national stage.4
Nevertheless, the United States takes great pride in the interpretations of the First
Amendment religion clauses to protect worship of all kind, and to erect (in Jefferson’s
famous, and contested, phrase) a wall of separation between government and organized
 Calvin Massey correctly notes that there was a de facto establishment of generic Protestantism as the national5
religion until the post-World War II development of modern establishment clause doctrine (Massey 2005: 11).  It is
important to note that recent achievements in Constitutional doctrine were not inevitable nor are they guaranteed to
survive. 
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religion, even if that wall is sometimes a bit porous.   In my examples above, after all, I noted5
that a Jew, Mormon and Catholic have all been prominent national politicians.  American
religiosity is real and important, but at the national level it is manifested not as a crude
tribalism centered on a particular confession but rather as an ethos of faith.  In some respects
there is a civil religion of sorts, denominated as the “Judeo-Christian tradition,” that seeks
to be broad enough to encompass most of the community while remaining specific and
substantive enough to provide a secure mortar for civic cohesiveness.  There certainly will
be some voters who will reject candidates solely on the basis of his or her religious creed
(and also solely on the basis of race, gender, or any of a number of non-political criteria), but
I suspect that a great majority of voters would be satisfied with some manner of devotion to
the Judeo-Christian tradition and generally would reject only an unrepentant atheist.
In light of these preliminary observations, it might appear that the United States is not
a secular nation.  Many might conclude that the United States cannot claim to be secular even
if it is religiously diverse and tolerant because faith plays too significant of a role in politics.
This conclusion, however, makes a critical, and misleading, assumption about what the term
“secular” means.  In this paper I untangle the complicated relationship between faith and
politics in the United States by exploring the case of President Barack Obama.  Obama is a
pathbreaking politician in many respects, but one of his most interesting features is the
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manner and degree to which his religious faith plays a role in his politics. Although a form
of “Obamamania” swept over Europe during his campaign and continues today, I want to
suggest that Obama may embody the new face of religious faith in American politics that
Europeans find so difficult to understand.  My thesis is that Obama might embody a means
for faith and politics to co-exist in the post-secular age.
I explore this paradoxical thesis in three parts.  First, I analyze the concept of
“secularism” and recover an understanding of our “secular” age that does not entail rejecting
religious belief as a source of public values.  Second, I discuss how Barack Obama is a
secular politician in this sense, and argue that he may help to define a break from the
traditional religious approach to politics exhibited by fundamentalist movements such as the
Moral Majority.  Finally, I discuss the central question for a post-secular constitutional
democracy: the role of religion in the public sphere.  I conclude that the United States has the
potential to be a secular state grounded in both religious belief and toleration, but this
presents a continuing challenge for our polity rather than an accomplishment to be celebrated.
1. Secularism with Faith?
Secularism is not a simple concept, and so I begin by adopting Charles Taylor’s
tripartite taxonomy (although I employ my own labels).  In political terms, secularism
represents a separation of church institutions from the organs of the state, consigning
religious institutions to the private realm.  In social terms, secularism represents a decline of
collective religious belief and practices within the private realm.  In phenomenological
 Taylor explains that a “common ‘subtraction’ story attributes everything to disenchantment.  First, science gave6
us ‘naturalistic’ explanation of the world.  And then people began to look for alternatives to God. . . . A fuller subtraction
story holds that not just disenchantment, but the fading of God’s presence in all three domains made us look afresh at
the alternative possible reference-points for fullness.  As though these were already there, just waiting to be invited in.”
(Taylor 2007: 26-27).
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terms, secularism refers to a world “in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one
human possibility among others,” “in which moreover, unbelief has become for many the
major default option,” and in which “a purely self-sufficient humanism [has come] to be a
widely available option” (Taylor 2007: 3, 14, 18).  Taylor provides a detailed analysis that
distinguishes political secularism from  the manifestation of secularism in social practices
and the modern phenomenology of human flourishing.  The purpose of this careful
exposition is to emphasize that the adoption of political secularism does not require or
necessarily result in secularism in these other two senses.  He specifically rejects “subtraction
stories,”  according to which modern secular humanism simply remained after we excised6
the overlay of religion from political life: “Against this kind of story, I will steadily be
arguing that Western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of new inventions, newly
constructed self-understandings and related practices, and can’t be explained in terms of
perennial features of human life” (Ibid: 22).  In other words, social secularism and
phenomenological secularism are socially-constructed realities rather than pre-existing
dimensions of existence that simply remained in place once political secularism chased
religion from the public sphere.
Taylor argues that secularism is a multifaceted development in these political, social
and phenomenological senses, and not just an inevitable byproduct of the growth of reason
 These reasons are expanded and discussed in detail by Berger, Davie and Focas (2008).  They provide an7
overview at (Ibid: 16-21).  George Dent also suggests that the “American exception” is explained by historical
circumstances that undermine the narrative of historical inevitability.  No colony had a church that exercised the power
of the Catholic Church in England, there was no established church hierarchy that coordinated with political hierarchies
but instead grass roots congregations that hired their ministers, there were relatively few abusive events such as the Salem
witch trials or criminal convictions for blasphemy, and finally an overriding Enlightenment ethos defined the political
theory of the burgeoning country (Dent 1999: 19-21).
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and technology following the Enlightenment.  A long and complex history has resulted in the
inhabitants of an enchanted and mysterious pre-scientific cosmos being replaced by
“buffered” individuals who exist in a physical universe upon which they gaze and over which
they lord.  This transition began within the religious tradition of the Church, culminating in
the Reformation; it has now reached the point of being an “exclusive humanism” that finds
the guiding principles of order solely in the flourishing of human nature through the exercise
of human capacities.  Nevertheless, exclusive humanism is not a uniform law of social
development, even within the narrow confines of the industrialized West.  Although
“educated, cultivated Europeans are extremely uncomfortable with any overt manifestations
of either strong nationalism or religious sentiment,” Taylor acknowledges that this is not the
case in America and that the difference must be explained (Taylor 2007: 522).  He cites as
factors the “long and positive experience of integration through religious identities, whereas
in Europe these have been factors of division;” the lack of a hierarchical society deferential
to the lifestyles of the elites who tend to be no less secular in America; and the fact that much
of formative American history occurred during the era surrounding the Victorian period,
which was a time of religious freedom and intense religiosity (Taylor 2007: 524-29).7
The existence of the American exception to the European experience suggests that
 Jürgen Habermas notes that the Weberian thesis that western rationalism would necessarily emerge as part of8
modernity and displace religious faith has proven to be misguided, as exemplified in the American context.  “Seen in
terms of world history, Max Weber’s ‘Occidental Rationalism’ now appears to be the actual deviation,” and what was
taken to be “the normal model for all other cultures suddenly becomes a special-case scenario” (Habermas 2006a: 2).
 Whereas this new value [of authenticity, freed from state power] could easily be9
associated with religious modes of expression in America, in Europe it was easier
to link religion with authority, with conformity to society-wide standards, not to
speak of hostile divisions between people, and even violence.  Churches and
religion still carried this baggage of submission and conformity for many people,
including the young, that it had long lost for many Americans.  In this situation, the
invitation to find one’s own way was bound to lead a larger number of people to
seek extra-religious forms of meaning in Europe than in the U.S.A. (Taylor 2007:
529).
 Despite Taylor’s succinct and persuasive account of the reasons for American exceptionalism in the story of10
secularization, he ends by saying that a satisfactory explanation “escapes” him (Ibid: 530).
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secularism might be construed more accurately as a European exception to the global
experience (Berger 2008: 9-10).   The majority of the world has not experienced the8
European development of secularism and, even within the industrialized West, the American
experience confirms that it is not a uniform and inevitable social development.  Taylor opines
that the absence of a need to cast off the ancien regime permitted America to follow a
different path.   He notes that the EU has magnified the secularization effects in Europe, and9
that the unsuccessful drive for a constitution may be explained partly by running up on the
shoals of a residual sense of religiosity in several countries and a reaction against the
transnational elites of the EU (Taylor 2007: 831n46).
I pause here to note that the puzzling  existence of the American exception must be10
discussed in terms of all three senses of secularism.  Taylor’s principal concern is with
phenomenological secularism, the modern constitution of selves who no longer look to
religion as a definitive source of human flourishing.  We certainly can distinguish the
 The most obvious examples are when communities attempt to display Christian symbols in public places11
during the holiday season, leading to a confused tangle of cases that escapes summarization and rational elaboration.
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American experience in this respect.  Even if faith has become a matter of choice for all
modern people, it is a choice that is made by many more Americans with a feeling that there
is no real choice.  So too, Americans are far less secular than Europeans in the social sense.
Americans are far more likely than Europeans to worship and practice the rites of their faith
publically and collectively.  This social dimension runs very deep in many communities, such
that the life of the church is in a real sense one of the primary sources of social life.  But the
story is more complex with respect to the third dimension of secularism – the political
dimension.  The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the exercise of
religion by citizens free from government control and also prohibits the establishment of a
religion by the government.  The First Amendment is the quintessential statement of political
secularism; in this sense, then, the American experience is secular, although the vibrant belief
of citizens regularly results in tensions between the two clauses of the Amendment.   We11
might conclude that Americans are politically secular, more or less, but that they are not
nearly as socially or phenomenologically secular as Europeans.
Having demonstrated that secularism is not just a story of “subtraction” – a peeling
away of ideology and false beliefs – but rather is the result of a multifaceted and ongoing
historical development of contemporary conceptions of self, others and universe, Taylor
predicts that there may be an incipient emergence of “spirituality without religion.”  Taylor
explains that “spirituality without religion” occurs as a local experience of the search for
 Taylor (2007: 533) explains: “The fading contact of many with the traditional languages of faith seems to12
presage a declining future.  But the very intensity of the search for adequate forms of spiritual life that this loss occasions
may be full of promise.”
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meaning set against the broader backdrop of European secularism.   This development is not12
the return of a religious worldview from the past – an “addition back” story, one might say
– but rather is a manifestation of the fact that we are in “a time in which the hegemony of the
mainstream master narrative of secularization will be more and more challenged” as people
seek more than what is offered by immediate, profane existence. (Taylor 2007: 534).
A recent book by Graeme Smith helps to sharpen this characterization of our current
situation.  Smith argues that the “secularization thesis” mistakes the backing away from the
intense religiosity of the nineteenth century as a rejection of religion rather than as a return
to more typical patterns of belief and religious practice.  “What the figures show is not the
decline of Christianity but its reversion to a normal status, something akin to what was
happening during the Middle Ages, after the astonishingly high levels of Christianity
displayed by the Victorians” (Smith 2008: 8).  The dramatic replacement of an enchanted
world with the Enlightenment world of technological science displaced the Church from a
significant portion of modern life, but Smith contends that the ethical life of the community
continues to be religious in nature even if this provenance is largely forgotten and now
hidden from view.  He contends that we “need to think of liberalism as a contemporary
Christian expression of ethical life,” and that the Christian legacy provides the means by
which contemporary society struggles with the ethical dilemmas that not only have persisted
 Smith’s conclusion to the book provides an excellent summary of the points that he developes:13
We are now in a position to summarize the religious and cultural identity
of Western secular society.  The people who live in contemporary Western secular
society have a dual mentality.  They are convinced of the functional superiority of
the scientific method for resolving technological problems.  This forms their
commitment to science.  But people realize that the scientific methodology cannot
address ethical issues.  What science allows for is unlimited technological advance.
But it has no inbuilt means of deciding that some advances are good and some are
wrong.  So they fall back on their traditional means of making ethical decisions,
namely Christianity.
One of the odd features of secular society is that a majority within it
believe in God.  What we have been arguing is that this expression of belief is a
serious proposition.  Christian culture has changed since the Victorian era.  It is less
dominant and fewer people now attend church in almost all parts of the West.  But
the Victorian period was exceptional for its high levels of Church allegiance.  What
has happened is that this fall-off has been described as a decline in Christianity.
Against this, I have argued that it is more properly seen as a reversion to more
normal levels of religious belief and practice.  What is more likely is that
Christianity is adapting and changing to the new conditions of post-Victorian
Christianity (Smith 2008: 204-05).
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in the age of science but have multiplied (Ibid: 183-285).13
Smith’s description accurately captures the situation in the United States.  Religion
has adapted in a manner that preserves its function in the social and phenomenological
dimensions of existence without necessarily intruding into the political realm.  One might
characterize this as a fragile detente between religion and politics.
The disdain for religion that long dominated Western thought is receding, due
in part to changes in Western religions (Dent 1999: 53).
*     *     *
Even secularists admits that religion has not faded away as forecasted;
indeed, except among intellectuals, it always retained a wide following.
Religion is now enjoying a renaissance in many places, particularly America.
Secularism survives, but debate has shifted in favor of religion for two primary
reasons.  First, religion has changed; many secularist criticisms of religion are
no longer valid in liberal democracies.  Second, many of the promises of
secularism were not fulfilled.  As a result, regard for secularism has
diminished, while regard for religion has advanced in both public affairs and
private morality (Ibid: 19).
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As religion adapts to the modern scientific era of political secularism, it gains strength within
the social lives of persons who regard bare politics as insufficient to ground their lives.  The
question is whether the fellowship of religious societies might buttress, without undermining,
the political fellowship of citizenship.
A signpost on the path to this new understanding can be found in the utterly
remarkable exchange between (then) Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas.  A
stalwart defender of modernity from the perspective of sociology and philosophy, Habermas
argues that secular society is grounded in democratic legitimation but nevertheless political
philosophy should not ignore faith traditions.  As he states, “more is involved here than
respect: philosophy has good reasons to be willing to learn from religious traditions”
(Habermas 2006b: 42).  To the surprise of some commentators, Habermas insists that “when
secularized citizens act in their role as citizens of the state, they must not deny in principle
that religious images of the world have the potential to express truth.  Nor must they refuse
their believing fellow citizens the right to make contributions in a religious language to
public debates” (Ibid: 51).  Habermas acknowledges that the Western philosophical tradition
is fundamentally shaped by the inter-penetration of Greek metaphysics and Christian faith,
and so the religious development of ethical knowledge over the centuries continues to hold
great significance in secular society (Ibid: 43-44).  He calls for a secularized political
community in which various faith communities sustain vibrant fellowships that cannot be
engendered by secular politics alone, with a constant exchange between these spheres.
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Cardinal Ratzinger agreed that there must be mutual recognition between the
rationalistic worldview of modern secularism and religious traditions.  With a bit of historical
license, he states that religion “must continually allow itself to be purified and structured by
reason; and this was the view of the Church Fathers, too” (Ratzinger 2006: 77).  Even more
remarkable, he insists that even a broad dialogue between secular politics and religion in the
Western tradition cannot claim universal (catholic?) status:
If we are to discuss the basic questions of human existence today, the
intercultural dimension seems to me absolutely essential – for such a
discussion cannot be carried on exclusively either within the Christian realm
or within the Western rational tradition (Ibid: 73).
[A]lthough the two great cultures of the West, that is, the culture of the
Christian faith and that of secular rationality, are an important contributory
factor (each in its own way) throughout the world and in all cultures,
nevertheless they are de facto not universal. . . . In other words, the rational or
ethical or religious formula that would embrace the whole world and unite all
persons does not exist; or, at least, it is unattainable at the present moment.
This is why the so-called “world ethos” remains an abstraction (Ibid: 75-76).
That these two thinkers can find some manner of common ground points toward the
possibility of a post-secular “spirituality without religion” that recognizes the powerful force
of faith without rejecting the political secularism in which modern faith flourishes.
The question – Is the United States a secular society? – can now be approached with
more sophistication and precision.  I believe that there would be wide agreement that the
United States is secular in the political sense, in some meaning of that term, and so I will not
 This is just to say that political secularism is not given as a strict program, but rather can occur in many forms.14
I think many Americans regard the “veil” controversy in France as a backward assertion of government authority into
the private sphere of belief that is neither neutral nor secular.  At the same time, the presence of crucifixes in the public
schools of Italy would strike Americans as improperly ensconcing the country’s Catholic legacy.  The balance between
“free exercise” and “nonestablishment” that forms the core of the First Amendment in the United States may be different
from European models, but I don’t think that one can seriously dispute that it qualifies as a model of modern political
secularism.  This is not to claim that the legal resolution of these issues is clear and without controversy.  As Calvin
Massey states, “the vast panoply of legal writing dissecting the doctrinal nuances of the Religion Clauses–a corpus that
combines an enormous range of perspectives with a depth approaching that of the Marianas Trench–suggests that
doctrinal analysis is slippery, treacherous, and ultimately unlikely to produce a satisfactory answer ” (Massey 2005: 1).
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elaborate that claim further.   In the social and phenomenological senses of secularism,14
though, it seems evident that the United States “lags behind” Europe in its development of
a modern secular society.  Because many American engage in religious activity as part of
their social practices and live within a religious worldview, it would appear that secularism
has penetrated the elites but not the great majority of citizens.  However, one must be careful
and precise on this point.  For all but a few religious believers, science is accepted as the
appropriate technology for dealing with health care matters, even if they might also pray for
the blessings of their God when suffering an illness.  Fundamentalists sometimes claim that
the world is only 4,000 years old, or that evolution is a pernicious myth, but the great
majority of believers appear to have no difficulty reconciling the findings of natural science
with the existence of their God.  The most fundamentalist of believers are not secular in the
social and phenomenological senses, but my guess is that, with respect to most believers, it
is a more complicated story.
One possibility is that the American experience in fact does lag behind the more
robust European secularism but also that it moves beyond European secularism.  Without
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centuries of religious turmoil set within a hierarchical social structure that shaped its
development, Americans did not have to reconstitute their social and phenomenological
worlds nearly to the same extent as Europeans in order to embrace modernity.  Moreover, the
United States embraced political secularism from the beginning of its existence as a state,
undoubtedly shaping the social and phenomenological experiences of faith in America.  In
the absence of a deep-seated political theology that had to be overcome in order to achieve
political secularism, the founding did not require the disruption of religious practices and
beliefs.  Finally, the anti-elitism (and, too often, anti-intellectualism) of America has
preserved religious belief in the populace as a viable cultural option.  The question is whether
the unique American experience of political secularism, combined with the strong trace of
the modern ethos of individualism, might offer the opportunity in America for a realization
of a post-secular society of believers in which members pursue religious spirituality without
asserting the role of formal religion in public life.  The American exception, in other words,
might represent a situation that leapfrogs over contemporary European secularism.  The idea
of spirituality without religion renounces any attempt to reverse political secularism while
at the same time making room for social and phenomenological developments that are not
cabined within the narrow ambit of an exclusive humanism that purports to be a neutral and
natural worldview.
Perhaps optimistically, I want to suggest that America’s exceptionalism with regard
to contemporary secular culture might develop in a manner that embraces “spirituality
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without religion” and continues the religious traditions as ethical guideposts without
surrendering the scientific worldview or backing away from political secularism.  I am not
just engaging in armchair musings, inasmuch as I believe that Barack Obama’s historic
ascension to the Presidency of the United States will provide a test case for exploring how
a post-secular Christian leader can take his faith seriously in his capacity as a political leader
without undermining political secularism.  In short, Obama may embody how Americans can
best reconcile faith and politics in the post-secular era.
2. Obama and the Post-Secular Role of Faith in Politics.
Barack Obama entered the national political stage with his famous address at the 2004
Democratic Convention in which he claimed that there was a single America rather than a
split between the “blue” states (urban, liberal and secular) and the “red” states
(predominantly rural, conservative and religious).  In the midst of that powerful speech he
noted that citizens of the blue states “worship an awesome God,” and celebrated hope as
“God’s greatest gift to us, the bedrock of this nation, a belief in things not seen, a belief that
there are better days ahead,” before concluding by saying, “Thank you and God bless you”
(Obama 2004).  It may have appeared to be a typical invocation of religious themes by a
politician, but it soon became clear that Obama’s faith had a very real influence on his liberal
politics.  As Stephen Mansfield describes,
It was a conscious attempt to reclaim the religious voice of the American
political left.  Those nine words [regarding belief in an awesome God] were
meant to echo the footsteps of nuns and clergymen who marched with Martin
Luther King Jr., of the religiously faithful who protested the Vietnam War or
  In his remarks, Obama noted that “Michelle and I are honored to join you in prayer this morning.  I know15
this breakfast has a long history in Washington, and faith has always been a guiding force in our family’s life, so we feel
very much at home [at the event] and look forward to keeping this tradition alive during our time here (Obama 2009).
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helped build the labor movement or prayed with Cesar Chavez.  Barack
Obama was raising the banner of what he hopes will be the faith-based politics
of the new generation, and he will carry that banner to whatever heights of
power his God and the American people allow (Mansfield 2008: xv).
Obama’s theme of hope, of the “audacity of hope,” was rooted in his faith.  This phrase was
the title of a sermon that had begun Obama’s conversion to active Christian belief as he
worked to organize disenfranchised people in Chicago (Ibid: 26).  As one scholar recently
asserted, “Obama is arguably the most theologically serious politician in modern American
political history,” and therefore his election “represents the possibility of a new relationship
between religion and politics” (Copeland 2009: 664, 691).  Obama confirmed the strength
of this relationship when he enthusiastically participated in the National Prayer Breakfast
shortly after his inauguration.15
It seems appropriate to refer to Obama’s Christian faith as a form of “spirituality
without religion” in the sense described by Taylor, and to do so without denigrating or
minimizing his faith.  Obama embraces his faith without surrendering critique or rationalism,
and without purporting to have found a universal truth that might be imposed on others.
“Thus, for Obama, Christianity is but one religious tree rooted in the common ethical soil of
all human experience” (Mansfield 2008: 55).  His Christian faith is an ethical guide that does
not purport to answer all questions, and therefore differs markedly from conservative
fundamentalist expressions of faith.
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He does not use the language of the traditional convert to Christianity.  He is
the product of a new, postmodern generation that picks and chooses its own
truth from traditional faith, much as a man customizes his meal at a buffet.
Obama does not recount that he felt an emptiness in his soul, was burdened by
the weight of his sins, and so responded to the love of Jesus, who promised to
save him and remake him in the image of God.  This is the language of
evangelicalism.  He says, instead, that he was seeking a “vessel” for his values,
a “community or shared traditions in which to ground my most deeply held
beliefs.”  Rather than yield his mind without reserve to Scripture and its
revelation of God, Obama was relieved that a “religious commitment did not
require me to suspend critical thinking.”  Rather than “renounce the world and
its ways” – standard Christian language for breaking with the sinful ways of
society – he was pleased that his faith would not require “retreat from the
world that I knew and loved.”  Rather than commit to Jesus Christ because of
truth he had already found sure, Obama instead admitted, “[T]he questions I
had didn’t magically disappear,” and so in conversation he “dedicated
[himself] to discovering [God’s] truth (Ibid: 52-53).
Obama’s faith is one of questioning rather than certainty, but this does not mean that his faith
is weak or tangential. “For Obama, faith is not simply political garb, something a focus group
told him he ought to try.  Instead, religion to him is transforming, lifelong, and real.  It is who
he is at the core, what he has raised his daughters to live by, and the well he will draw from
as he leads” (Ibid: 143).
Obama’s approach to religion might be considered “post-modern,” reflecting the fact
that pre-modern religious commitments can be refashioned and experienced in the post-
secular age.  His faith is open and dialogic rather than circumscribed and univocal.  He views
his Christian faith commitment as one of many faiths that can be a productive and motivating
source for personal values that have social dimension.  In his remarks at the National Prayer
Breakfast he recognized the necessity of bringing people of different faiths together to work
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for social justice by engaging in a “productive and peaceful dialogue” that “can begin to
crowd out the destructive forces of zealotry and make room for the healing power of
understanding” (Obama 2009).
Mark Modak-Truran has argued that a new postmodern understanding of faith may
permit us to abandon the failed project of a wholly secularized basis for law and politics and
to return to a religious legitimation of law (Modak-Truran 2007).  He argues that we must
embrace a “constructive postmodern paradigm” to legitimate law.
A unitary religious (pre-modern) or secular (modern) legitimation of law
appears to be an outdated or erroneous assumption of pre-modern and modern
paradigms.  It fails to take religious pluralism seriously.  Rather than proposing
a fixed, unitary foundation for the law, I will argue that the legitimation of law
depends on the plurality of religious and comprehensive convictions in the
culture.  Under the constructive postmodern paradigm, the text of the law must
be explicitly secularized (i.e., no explicit recognition of religion), but at the
same time, the law is implicitly legitimated by a plurality of religious
foundations.  The constructive postmodern paradigm of law and religion thus
leads to the desecularization of the law (Ibid: 231).   
Referencing the cases involving the public display of the Ten Commandments,  Fred
Gedicks and Roger Hendrix suggest that the often-invoked “Judeo-Christian” ethos is now
too thin to encompass the diversity of faiths and non-believers in society, and that an
emerging postmodern approach to faith as spirituality may be necessary (Gedicks 2007).
This post-creedal spirituality “incorporates the consumer mentality of a marketplace in which
believers shop for beliefs and practices, picking and choosing from among diverse and even
incompatible denominations and traditions” (Ibid: 286).  Calvin Massey has explained that
the emergence of post-modern religious faith may lend some justification for the Supreme
Lest the reader think that legislative primacy supplies a recipe for endless16
sectarian strife, with little intervention from the courts, consider some final
possibilities of the post-modern sensibility as manifested in religious belief and
conduct.  The basic religious divide in a post-modern world separates pre-modern
fundamentalist religion and post-modern spirituality.  Fundamentalism, of whatever
brand, asserts a universal and exclusive truth. . . . 
A question that hovers over the metaphysical cusp in which we live is
whether the post-modern understanding will displace pre-modern fundamentalism,
or whether fundamentalism will triumph and displace post-modernism.  I do not
pretend to know the answer, but I do offer some preliminary thoughts, coupled with
some observations about the probable related effects on the law of the Religion
Clauses.  Fundamentalism requires a sublimation of individual will to the demands
of an eternal God. . . .
By contrast, post-modern spirituality is inherently flexible and malleable.
All avenues to self-discovery are equally valid (Massey 2005: 50-51).
Massey concludes that the resolution at this point is uncertain.
While it is too soon to know whether legislative primacy will ameliorate
or exacerbate religious conflict, it is not too soon to declare our entrance into a new
era of the law of the Religion Clauses.  Perhaps the metaphysics of post-modernism
will produce sufficient religious toleration that the political dynamic of religious
rent-seeking will moderate, and will result in an increase in aggregate preference
satisfaction without destabilizing side effects.  But it is also possible that the
mixture of extreme religious pluralism, post-modern uncertainty, and religious rent-
seeking will prove to be volatile.  Let us hope the Court will be attentive to the
effects of legislative primacy and modify it as necessary to account for conditions
as they develop (Ibid: 54).
This willingness to entertain more governmental interaction with religion under the potentially changed
conditions of post-modernity should be contrasted with Steve Smith’s somewhat naive position that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence ought to accommodate government endorsement of the Judeo-Christian heritage of our country as long
as such religious expression is nonsectarian in nature (Smith 2005).  Smith argues that while our Constitution is most
assuredly agnostic on religious matters, this “does not entail that governments operating under the Constitution must
be secular or must refrain from religious expressions,” since any such localized expression would not be fundamentally
constitutive of the community (Smith 2008: 123-24, 158).  However, this approach tilts against the reality that the
supposed Judeo-Christian values expressed by government might be no more than an aggregation of several sects seeking
to define the community at the expense of a great many fellow citizens.  In reply to the argument that only postmodern
religious beliefs can avoid the sectarianism that is the target of the Establishment Clause (Gedicks 2007), Smith asserts
that there is no reason to believe that invocations of generic religious language is intended to be divisive or exclusionary
(Smith 2007a: 310).  Suffice it to say that the concrete lived experiences of many people in this country, including my
own in South-central Pennsylvania for nine years, leads them to be skeptical about Smith’s faith in the genuine character
of such expressions.
Smith is certainly correct to note the disingenuousness of the official party line that the “Constitution mandates
that the government remain secular . . .” (County of Allegheny 1989: 610).  William Marshall noted that there were
widespread violations of the Establishment Clause in the days following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America because
there was an outpouring of official religious expression (Marshall 2002).  Because religion in America “is not merely
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Court to acknowledge and then defer to greater legislative authority in articulating what
governmental neutrality means with respect to religious belief because the threat of sectarian
strife will have been greatly reduced.   According to the most recent Pew survey, American16
a private phenomenon” but instead is “deeply embedded in our public culture” (Ibid: 15-16), such a reaction was
understandable – and perhaps unavoidable.  But tolerating these kinds of spontaneous outbursts in extreme situations
as a pragmatic matter is far different from endorsing ongoing generic religious expression by the government.  As
Marshall notes, there “is a difference between a city sponsoring a one-time prayer service for the victims of the World
Trade Center bombing and its implementing a daily school prayer as an ongoing September 11 memoriam” (Ibid: 32).
Surprisingly, Marshall does not discuss the backlash against Muslims in the United States and the often overtly Judeo-
Christian expressions of faith by governments after the attacks.
 As the Report states in the Summary of Key Findings:17
A major survey by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life finds that
most Americans have a non-dogmatic approach to faith.  A strong majority of those
who are affiliated with a religion, including majorities of nearly every religious
tradition, do not believe their religion is a way to salvation.  And almost the same
number believes that there is more than one true way to interpret the teachings of
their religion.  This openness to a range of religious viewpoints is in line with the
great diversity of religious affiliation, belief and practice that exists in the United
States (The U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 2008: 3)
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believers increasingly are non-dogmatic in their approach to religious belief, suggesting that
the postmodern approach to faith may increasingly a lived reality and not just an academic
account.17
When viewed against the backdrop of a postmodern approach to religion, Obama’s
efforts to connect faith and politics appear more plausible.  Shortly before announcing his
Presidential candidacy, Obama delivered the Keynote Address at a Call to Renewal
conference in 2006 entitled, “From Poverty to Opportunity: A Covenant for a New America”
(Obama 2006b).  He could have focused on the public policy prescriptions advocated by the
group, but instead he discussed how to “reconcile faith with our modern, pluralistic
democracy” because he believes it is a “mistake . . . to fail to acknowledge the power of faith
in people’s lives” (Ibid).  Many social problems are beyond the capacity for government to
address, and so there is a need for an ethical commitment to social reform beyond political
prescriptions.  “After all, the problems of poverty and racism, the uninsured and the
 It is important to remember that Obama became an active Christian while he was a community organizer18
working with churches in Chicago and while he was a member of the Trinity United Church of Christ, a predominantly
black church whose (now infamous) Pastor, Jeremiah Wright, espoused a form of racial liberation theology.  It should
come as no surprise that Obama relates his religious faith to politics so strongly, particularly with respect to issues of
social justice.  In his famous speech on race after the controversy surrounding some of Jeremiah Wright’s statements
from the pulpit, Obama expressly linked the quest for racial justice to his faith, stating dramatically that he could “no
more disown him than I can disown the black community” (Obama 2008).
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unemployed, are not simply technical problems in search of the perfect ten point plan.  They
are rooted in both societal indifference and individual callousness – in the imperfections of
man” (Ibid).  He stresses that liberal Christians should not be hesitant to let their faith guide
them in addressing these deeper problems.18
Obama does not call on his fellow Democrats to adopt a veneer of religiosity as a
political tool, but rather invites them to accept the possibility of a genuine engagement
between faith and politics:
I am not suggesting that every progressive suddenly latch on to religious
terminology – that can be dangerous.  Nothing is more transparent than
inauthentic expressions of faith.  As Jim has mentioned, some politicians come
and clap – off rhythm  – to the choir.  We don’t need that.
. . .
But what I am suggesting is this – secularists are wrong when they ask
believers to leave their religion at the door before entering into the public
square.  Frederick Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, Williams Jennings Bryant,
Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King – indeed, the majority of great reformers in
American history – were not only motivated by faith, but repeatedly used
religious language to argue for their cause.  So to say that men and women
should not inject their “personal morality” into public policy debates is a
practical absurdity.  Our law is by definition a codification of morality, much
of it grounded in the Judeo-Christian tradition (Ibid).    
This engagement requires some ground rules, Obama stresses, including a strict political
secularism that recognizes the diversity of faiths and the existence of nonbelievers, the
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obligation to ground public policy arguments in concepts and principles that are not just part
of the creed of a specific religion, and using fair-minded words that do not disparage
anyone’s political position solely on account of his or her religious beliefs.
 In a chapter in The Audacity of Hope that expands his speech, Obama renders his
thinking concrete by making it personal.  In response to a lesbian friend upset that he had
used his religious beliefs to help explain why he supports civil equality for gays and lesbians
but opposes same-sex marriage, and to a Christian doctor offended by the manner in which
his website characterized opponents to abortion, he called himself to task.
And I was reminded that it is my obligation, not only as an elected
official in a pluralistic society but also as a Christian, to remain open to the
possibility that my unwillingness to support gay marriage is misguided, just as
I cannot claim infallibility in my support of abortion rights.  I must admit that
I may have been infected with society’s prejudices and predilections and
attributed them to God; that Jesus’ call to love one another might demand a
different conclusion; and that in years hence I may be seen as someone who
was on the wrong side of history.  I don’t believe such doubts make me a bad
Christian.  I believe they make me human, limited in my understandings of
God’s purpose and therefore prone to sin.  When I read the Bible, I do so with
the belief that it is not a static text but the Living Word and that I must be
continually open to new revelations – whether they come from a lesbian friend
or a doctor opposed to abortion.
This is not to say that I’m unanchored in my faith.  There are some
things that I’m absolutely sure about – the Golden Rule, the need to battle
cruelty in all its forms, the value of love and charity, humility and grace
(Obama 2006c: 223-24).
If there can be a post-secular relationship between faith and politics, Obama appears to be
striving to define it and embrace it in his political and personal life.
One example of Obama’s faith and politics in action is found in his votes as a Senator
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against the confirmation of Judge John Roberts and Judge Samuel Alito to serve as Justices
on the United States Supreme Court.  In both cases Obama released a short statement that
praised the men for their knowledge, temperament and legal skills; nevertheless, he found
them to be unacceptable for a position on the high court.  With respect to Judge Roberts,
Obama indicated that his concern was for the cases in which lawyerly skills were not enough
to resolve the issue, given his record of using “his formidable skills on behalf of the strong
in opposition to the weak” (Obama 2005).  With respect to Judge Alito, he argued that “he
consistently sides on behalf of the powerful against the powerless; on behalf of a strong
government or corporation against upholding Americans’ individual rights” (Obama 2006a).
These judgments are founded in the Judeo-Christian tradition that persists despite political
secularization, and Obama would likely acknowledge as much.  Although not framed in a
creedal manner, his arguments are the arguments of a believer in the public square,
participating in what Graeme argues has occurred from the beginning: the continual
transformation and re-invention of Christianity by ordinary people (Smith 2008: 88).
The United States is not a secular nation in the way that European countries are
secular.  But the American exception might point forward rather than backward.  In a world
that is filled with oppressive regimes and theocracies, a post-secular detente between
liberalism and faith that can produce a respectful and reciprocal relationship should not be
dismissed out of hand.  Whether Obama will advance this project as President remains to be
seen, but his desire to do so is clear from his public statements.  As one commentator
 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, both Falwell and Robertson famously stated that America’s19
secularism had led to God’s disapproval and opened the way for the attacks, leading European commentators to declare
that America had become a theocracy (See, e.g., Kurtz 2001).  For a description of the increasing influence on politics
by conservative evangelical believers during the 1970s and 1980s, see (Lindsay 2007).
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summarized, after Obama’s speech on faith his “worldview was integrated and firm.  He was
a liberal Christian, embracing a faith-based liberal political vision, and he planned to take
both into his nation’s corridors of power” (Mansfield 2008: 99).
3. Having Faith in a Secularism that can Embrace Faith.
The foregoing description of President Obama’s position fails to resolve the most
pressing question in contemporary thinking about the relationships between law, politics and
religion.  Liberal theorists have assumed that political secularism inevitably will be weakened
if the polity embraces the social and phenomenological religiosity of believers in the public
square.  They argue that any manner of religious argumentation in political contexts will be
divisive and infect democratic politics with sectarian power plays.  There is much in
European history to warrant this fear, but even in recent American history the influence of
the (misnamed) Moral Majority has fueled these concerns.  The seeming ability of
conservative Protestant ministers such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson to motivate
believers to shape political action for religious ends has led some to regard America as
teetering toward an evangelical theocracy.   The question posed by Obama’s election is19
whether the government might embrace social and phenomenological “spirituality without
religion” without necessarily undermining political secularism in the manner threatened by
 In this short paper I do not claim to analyze any problems raised by the political activities of groups such as20
the Moral Majority.  I accept the claim that such movements may threaten democratic values and political secularism
for the sake of argument, because I will contend that Obama’s model of the interaction of religious faith and political
engagement does not raise the same concerns; instead, this model demonstrates the way in which those with conservative,
evangelical beliefs may be welcomed in the public square.
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conservative, evangelical movements in recent American history.20
The traditional liberal response to this threat has been to separate starkly the private
realm of religious belief and the public realm of politics.  Modern constitutional democracies
purport to embody the separation thesis, and post-War Establishment Clause jurisprudence
in the United States is a halting effort to implement this reality.  But the halting quality of the
effort arises because religious belief remains important to many Americans, and democracy
would appear to make it inevitable that religious motivations will be brought to bear on
public policies.  John Rawls famously sought to negotiate this impasse by preserving the
private realm of competing comprehensive belief systems but requiring that citizens offer
only “public reasons” when they speak on matters of democratic governance (Rawls 1993:
212-54).  Near the end of his career, Rawls recognized that requiring religious believers to
offer only “public reasons” was unworkable, leading him to offer a proviso that would
maintain the benefits of secularism without unfairly burdening believers.  Under his proviso,
citizens are permitted “to introduce into political discussion at any time [their]
comprehensive doctrine, religious or non-religious, provided that, in due course, [they] give
properly public reasons to support the policies and principles [their] comprehensive doctrine
 The proviso has been summarized and explained succinctly by Paul Weithman:21
The proviso raises a number of questions.  The basic idea, however, is clear enough.
Citizens may offer religious arguments in public for their political positions.  But
in a pluralistic society, they should also be aware that not everyone will share their
religious premises or regard their arguments as providing good reasons for the
policies and principles they favor.  They must therefore be ready to make good their
religious arguments by supplementing them with what Rawls calls “properly public
reasons” (Weithman 2007: 48).  
 Horwitz concludes that Obama “offers a rich and meaningful engagement with religion and its role in public22
life, one that is certainly leagues away from the strategy of avoidance practiced by Kennedy.  At the same time, Obama
too exacts a price for religion’s place in public life, demanding that religion express itself only in terms that may not
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is said to support” (Rawls 1999: 144).   Of course, this adjustment merely framed the21
question rather than answering it.
It is obvious that Obama’s speeches and books adopt generally the Rawlsian
resolution of the dilemma of religion in the public square.  It should come as no surprise that
a highly educated believer such as Obama would know the Rawlsian position and would
draw from it, but his general invocation of the “public reasons” approach is not nearly
specific enough to address contemporary issues and problems.  Paul Horwitz applauds
Obama’s support of an engagement of religion by politicians, but he rejects Obama’s
seeming refusal to permit the inclusion of religious discourse in the public sphere.
Referencing Obama’s assertion that “our deliberative, pluralistic democracy” requires “the
religiously motivated [to] translate their concerns into universal, rather than religion-specific,
values” (Obama 2006c: 219), Horwitz correctly notes that this position is even stricter than
Rawls’s proviso on public reason.  “It demands absolute translation of religious arguments
into publicly accessible language rather then simply requiring religious reasons to be joined
with publicly accessible ones” (Horwitz 2008: 60).   However, it is important to remember22
come naturally to it” (Horwitz 2008: 50).
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that Obama has not written a treatise on moral and political philosophy, and so his speeches
should not be held to that standard.  Rather, the question is whether Obama’s outlook and
actions might be construed in a manner that meets the pressing questions of post-Rawlsian
moral and political philosophy even if Obama has not articulated these more subtle and
nuanced positions that lie behind his generic invocation of Rawls.
In recent years, a number of scholars of law and religion have argued that strict
separation is impossible if religious belief flourishes as phenomenological and social realities
and if we take democracy seriously.  For example, Richard Ekins (2005:81) rejects the
secular fundamentalism that has predominated in Europe and instead urges a policy of “twin
toleration,” concluding that “regimes that entrench secularism and exclude religious groups
from participation in politics are not truly democratic.”  If democracy is the guiding light of
constitutional regimes, Ekins argues that there can be no fundamentalism – whether religious
or secular in nature; rather, there must be interaction between these realms of social
organization without permitting either to dominate the other.  Politics must tolerate free
worship and assembly of believers, while religion must acknowledge the priority of
democratic political rule (Ibid: 89).
Truly democratic regimes are characterized in their church-state relations by
the twin tolerations and priority for democracy.  Thus, in a democracy,
believers are free to worship as they see fit, as well as to participate in public
life.  The state has autonomy to reach its own policy decisions and authority
to implement those decisions without being constrained by religious veto.  In
this way, while there is no strict wall of separation, political actors observe a
 Kent Greenawalt suggests that law provides a good model of these differing obligations with respect to23
utilizing religious argumentation (Greenawalt 2007).  The obligation of a judge to decide cases according to law might
generally be viewed as forbidding any reliance on religious belief in justifying a result, whereas a politician casting a vote
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distinction between civil and religious authority and give priority to the
outcomes of democratic procedures, irrespective of their inconsistency with
individual or group preferences.  To be sustainable, religious groups’ support
for democracy must be justified from within their traditions.  It follows, then,
that contra secular fundamentalism democratization may well require explicitly
religious arguments for democracy (Ibid: 92).
The separation thesis appears hopelessly at odds with democratic governance in societies in
which large segments of the populace are motivated by a variety of religious cosmologies.
Rejecting the strict separation of politics and religion only begins the analysis.  Jürgen
Habermas recently has challenged the dogma of Rawlsian “public reasons” for being
insufficiently attentive to the democratic character of the modern state, providing what might
have been an unexpected detailed defense of religious expression in democratic politics.
Citizens may not fully participate in democratic politics, Habermas insists, if the polity
merely tolerates religious expression as an unfortunate anachronism and enforces a strictly
secular ideology that places intolerable motivational and psychological limitations on a large
segment of the population (Habermas 2006a: 4-9).  To return to the tripartite understanding
of secularism, Habermas lauds the emergence of political secularism but finds that it has
inappropriately been employed in an effort to marginalize social and phenomenological
religious expression.  This leads him to conclude that Rawlsian “public reasons” are
legitimately required of government officials acting in their official capacity, but cannot be
strictly applied to the democratic activity of citizens (Ibid: 8-9).   “The liberal state must not23
in favor of legislation might properly reference religious motivations for the vote.  Even more starkly, a citizen who votes
in a referendum might properly refer to her religious beliefs as the sole criterion for this exercise of lawmaking power.
 Habermas writes:24
This cognitive act of adaptation needs to be distinguished from the political virtue
of mere tolerance.  What is at stake is not some respectful feel for the possible
existential significance of religion for some other person.  What we must also
expect of the secular citizens is moreover a self-reflective transcending of a
secularist self-understanding of Modernity.
As long as secular citizens are convinced that religious traditions and
religious communities are to a certain extent archaic relics of pre-modern societies
that continue to exist in the present, they will understand freedom of religion as the
cultural version of the conservation of a species in danger of becoming extinct.
From their viewpoint, religion no longer has nay intrinsic justification to exist. . .
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transform the requisite institutional separation of religion and politics into an undue mental
and psychological burden for those of its citizens who follow a faith” (Ibid: 9).  Even more,
Habermas contends that “the liberal state has an interest in unleashing religious voices in the
political public sphere” and “must not discourage religious persons and communities from
also expressing themselves politically as such, for it cannot know whether secular society
would not otherwise cut itself off from key resources for the creation of meaning and
identity. . . . Religious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions,
especially with regard to vulnerable forms of communal life” (Ibid: 10).
Habermas articulates the political counterpart to his philosophical exchange with
Cardinal Ratzinger on the need to respect plural ways of knowing and meaning-formation.
He frames the political implication of his approach as the need to recognize a “reciprocal
cognitive burden” to translate one’s worldview, whether religious or secular, into a language
that can sustain political dialogue (Habermas 2007: 15).  He expressly disavows the
condescending “toleration” of religion by liberal political theorists.   “In short, post-24
. Citizens who adopt such an epistemic stance toward religion can obviously no
longer be expected to take religious contributions to contentious political issues
seriously and even to help to assess them for a substance that can possibly be
expressed in a secular language and justified by secular arguments (Habermas 2007:
15).
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metaphysical thought is prepared to learn from religion, but remains agnostic in the process.
It insists on the difference between the certainties of faith, on the one hand, and validity
claims that can be publically criticized, on  the other; but it refrains from the rationalist
presumption that it can itself decide what part of the religious doctrines is rational and what
part is irrational” (Habermas 2006: 17)
Habermas may not have definitively resolved these questions, but his important essay
has been at the forefront of a number of efforts at sustained and careful reconsideration of
the Rawlsian position.  It is not so much the case that Rawls was mistaken, as that he wrote
in a period in which there was no comprehensive worldview that was rigorously secular
(Boettcher 2009: 222-24).  The ascent of philosophical naturalism in recent years means that
it is no longer plausible to gesture toward secularism as a tolerant perspective that permits
those with different worldviews to join together in political friendship.  Cristina Lafont has
challenged Habermas for not going far enough in his revision of the Rawlsian doctrine of
public reasons (Lafont 2007).  Lafont contends that Habermas imposes artificial restraints
on religious dialogue in the public sphere at the level of formal governance that are not
similarly imposed on other comprehensive doctrines (Lafont 2009: 131).  Her alternative charts
a path between imposing severe restraints on religious dialogue or eliminating all restraint.
According to this policy, citizens who participate in political advocacy in the
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informal public sphere can appeal to any reasons they sincerely believe in, which
support the coercive policies they favor, provided that they are prepared to address
any objections based on reasons generally acceptable to democratic citizens that other
participants may advance against such policies. . . . According to this proposal, the
only element of restraint involved in meeting the liberal criterion of democratic
legitimacy is that citizens must refrain from imposing a coercive policy until
objections based on generally acceptable reasons have been successfully defeated
(Lafont 2009: 132).
This corrective seeks to preserve public reasons as a tempering force rather than a univocal
and exclusive language.  Lafont explains this difference:
The dilemma that Habermas’ proposal seems to face brings the central
question into focus: is it possible to recognize what is right about the cognitive
objection to the Rawlsian proposal without having to give up on the liberal
criterion of democratic legitimacy.  In my view, the answer is yes.  As I will
try to show in what follows, a proper accoutn of the ethics of citizenship must
recognize the right of all democratic citizens to take their own cognitive stance
in public deliberation.  This is the most compelling element of the cognitive
objection, since leaving any politically active citizens no other option but to be
disingenuous is certainly an undue cognitive burden.  However, this right by
no means includes an additional right to the protection of the integrity of such
cognitive stances, as the objection also suggests.  It seems obvious that public
deliberation, as a collective enterprise, would be pointless if citizens had a
right to include their own views and reasons in public deliberation, but no
subsequent obligation to check whether they can be made good in view of
other available arguments.  Consequently, a successful policy of mutual
accountability requires combining the right to include the cognitive stances of
all democratic citizens with the need to secure reasons acceptable to everyone
for the coercive political decisions with which all citizens must comply (Lafont
2009: 141).
Public reasons are given priority not because they are the only legitimate reasons, but because
they are “the only ones towards which no one can remain indifferent in their political
advocacy.  Whereas public reasons need not be the only source from which a rationale in
support of  each proposed coercive policy must be crafted, they are the kind of reasons that
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cannot be ignored, disregarded, or overridden once they are brought to public deliberation
by any citizen.  They are the reasons that all politically active citizens must engage in their
own terms if they are offered as objections to the coercive policies under discussion. . . .
Citizens have no obligation to provide either public reasons or translations in terms of public
reasons for each policy proposal they support or criticize, but they do have the obligation to
address any such reason that is introduced by others against their proposals.” (Lafont 2009:
141-42).  And, rephrased more specifically to address the question of argumentation rooted
in religious beliefs, she summarizes: “Whereas it seems at best unfeasible and at worst
disingenuous to ask religious citizens who participate in political advocacy to come up with
non-religious reasons in support of the policies they favor, regardless of what their sincere
beliefs happen to be in each specific case, it does seem both feasible and legitimate to ask
them to address any objections offered by other citizens against these policies which are
based on reasons generally acceptable to democratic citizens” (Lafont 2009: 143-44).   
One of the animating themes in the contemporary literature is the conviction that
comprehensive doctrines may be advanced in the public square in a manner that does not
threaten oppression or domination of fellow citizens.  John Haldane captures this spirit:
Let the comprehensive doctrines come to the table, the forum, or the assembly.  Let
them present themselves, in their own terms, but also in a manner whose animating
principles include toleration.  Rawls insists that it is not part of his position that the
burdens of judgment under which political deliberation operates constitute
skepticism.  But if we are not to be skeptical about practical rationality (concerning
ends as well as means), then there is no reason to fear the advancement of
comprehensive doctrines in a context in which we settle for a modus vivendi
sustained by a shared humane liberality.  Indeed, there is reason to regard this as a
desirable goal, and one more ennobling in its account of humankind than is the
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conception of political society as sustained by the systematic curtailment of
substantive philosophies of human nature and conduct (Haldane 2007: 190).   
The idea of a “shared humane liberality” is at once a rejection of ultimate truths and also a
rejection of radical skepticism.  In the post-Enlightenment age, we have come to re-discover
the realm of rhetoric, in which arguments may be reasonable without being compelling under
the strict dictates of logic and rationality (Mootz 2006).  From a rhetorical point of view,
there is no difficulty permitting those engaged in debate to refer to comprehensive doctrines,
so long as the rhetorical ethos of argumentation is maintained (Sammons 2009).  Returning
to Lafont’s notion of “mutual accountability,” we might add detail to her program by noting
that a political community can exist only on the basis of shared topoi and a sensus communis,
but that these bases for “public reasons” do not exhaust the rhetorical sources of
argumentation which should not be barred from the public square.  The effort by Rawls to
avoid public strife is not realized by restricting the scope of rhetoric in the public square;
rather, public cohesion can be fostered by embracing the full range of rhetoric and insisting
only on maintaining the rhetorical space in which this public dialogue may take place.
These recent efforts to expand the scope of Rawls’s proviso without surrendering the
important gains of political secularism provide important theoretical support for Obama’s
effort to define a post-secular politics.  However, it is appropriate to temper my argument that
Obama represents an important development in the relationship between faith and politics
in the post-secular age.  In a careful recounting of the fragile achievement of political
secularism against the backdrop of centuries of religious bloodshed and tyranny, Mark Lilla
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(2007) cautions us against intellectual complacency that permits the erosion of political
secularism by seeking to accommodate the persistence of social and phenomenological
religious belief and practices.  He posits a binary choice: embrace the political theology that
continues to grip much of the world or persevere in the development of secular politics.
Lilla’s provocative thesis is that secularism has been undermined by political theorists who
sought a liberal theology that could ground moral sentiments and political legitimacy without
devolving into sectarian political tyranny.  These thinkers seek to permit religion back into
the public sphere on liberal political terms, but the result is a “stillborn God, unable to inspire
genuine conviction among those seeking ultimate truth,” thereby unwittingly creating an
environment in which political theology can again take hold to satisfy the metaphysical hopes
of citizens (Lilla 2007: 301).  Lilla argues that contemporary thinkers are unmindful of this
dangerous dynamic because they are too prone to believe that political secularism is an
inevitable and irreversible result of Western modernity (Lilla 2007: 305), and that the “it is
only thanks to a strong constitutional structure and various lucky breaks that political
theology has never managed to dominate the American political mind” in light of the greater
resonance of religion in the United States (Lilla 2007: 307).
Lilla urges a reaffirmation of the fundamental choice that defines Western secularism,
arguing that we “have wagered that it is wiser to beware the forces unleashed by the Bible’s
messianic promise than to try exploiting them for the public good.  We have chosen to keep
our politics unilluminated by the light of revelation.  If our experiment is to work, we must
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rely on our own lucidity” (309).  Lilla delivers a direct rebuke to the notion of a postmodern
religious sensibility, in which the social and phenomenological spirituality of citizens can
support political activity without undermining political secularism.  His assessment and
warning are sobering and persuasive.  It makes sense to place the burden of proof on Obama
and those who would seek a reconciliation of religious belief and political secularism,
exercising caution and seeking to ensure that the benefits of political secularism are
strengthened as we define politics in the post-secular age.
Conclusion.
In a recent essay about the status of the United States as a “righteous empire,” Peter
Fitzpatrick emphasizes the destabilizing reality resulting when an Empire operates with
religious fervor rather than simply as a matter of conquest, asking “how can the United States
hold itself out righteously and assertively as exemplifying human rights whilst acting in ways
that do not observe human rights?” (Fitzpatrick 2008).  America’s non-secularism poses
dangers, but may also deliver the most potent critique of some of its more odious policies.
Although the United States does not follow the path of secularization in the same manner as
Europe, the embrace of a post-secular relationship between faith and politics may provide
a basis for America to become truly righteous – morally justified, correct and upstanding –
and thereby to assume its role as a shining city on the hill.  This is Obama’s political goal:
to restore righteousness in the place of the dogmatism, insularity and hubris that have grown
out of pre-secular religious impulses.  Although the perils Obama faces in this quest are
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many and obvious, the potential for a righteous politics appears very real indeed.
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